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ABSTRACT 
Through the Directorate General of Housing Financing, the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing 
estimates that by 2025 the number of housing needs in Indonesia will reach 30 million units based on 
calculating housing needs (backlog) of population growth. In 2015, the Government Program's number of 
achievements for the Construction of One Million Houses was around 700 thousand units. In 2016, it reached 
805,169 housing units, and in 2017 onwards, it is expected to reach the target of 1 million houses per year. The 
main problem in a housing development or the property sector is land availability and various communities' 
purchasing power. The government policy related to the construction of 1 million houses coupled with easy 
licensing of the land sector and provision of subsidies such as the liquid housing finance facility (FLPP) has 
stimulated the banking sector and other financial institutions to finance the property sector. The residential 
segment, namely apartments and housing, is the most significant contributor to the national property 
capitalization value, reaching 55.8%. The growth rate of the capitalization value of the residential sector reached 
16.5%, from Rp. 152.7 trillion to Rp. 177.9 trillion in 2017. Focusing on KPR and KPA during the 2015-2017 
period at banks listed on the Stock Exchange Indonesia. 
 




The need to provide housing for people in Indonesia ranges from 820,000 to 1 million houses 
per year. This need can be met by around 40 percent by the private sector, while only about 20 percent 
comes from government intervention. The rest, which is as much as 40 percent, cannot be fulfilled to 
become the backlog. Of the unfulfilled amount, 40 percent can afford to buy a house but need 
government assistance in the form of subsidies, and the other 20 percent cannot afford a house. The 
difference in community needs will continue to accumulate into the following years. If every year 
around 1 million houses are needed and only 60 percent can be fulfilled both from private and 
government intervention, there will always be a backlog. Currently, the estimate is that there are 10-
12 million home backlogs. This figure will continue to grow if the financing aspect is not resolved 
and facilitated. 
"What are the implications if it is not resolved? We will see urbanization in Indonesia as 
unstructured urbanization. So that more and more people live in slum areas, it is increasingly difficult 
to regulate. In all Indonesian cities, the government cannot complete and implement a response policy 
because it does not stop each year, but it will increase every year. Meanwhile, urban Indonesia's 
population growth is an average of 4.1%, far from the population growth in general due to migration 
from villages or small towns to larger cities. In general, the housing backlog is a condition of the gap 
between the number of houses built and the number of houses needed. In this sense, the Housing 
Backlog is the number of houses that have not been handled. The housing backlog is calculated based 
on the concept that one housing unit is per household or the family's head. 
Based on the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) records, each year, houses' 
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need reaches 800,000 units. Before the One Million Houses Program's launch in 2015, the maximum 
housing development per year was only 200,000 units. However, after the government's building of 1 
million houses was rolled out, the realization of housing construction increased by four times. In 
2015, housing builders reached 699,770 units, then in 2016 it increased again to 805,169 units, and by 
the end of 2017, it had reached 904,758 units (697,770 units for MBR and 224,988 non-MBR units), 
exceeding the target of 900,000 units by the end of 2017. The number of home backlogs in 2015, 
according to the Ministry of PUPR, reached 11.4 million units. Of the large backlog, 60% of them are 
middle-class people who need assistance through the KPR subsidy scheme for Housing Financing 
Liquidity Facility (FLPP). 
Meanwhile, the remaining 20% are commercial, so they do not need government subsidies, and 
the other 20% are from the lower classes who still need assistance from the government in the form of 
social assistance. Commercial banks can perform services in payment traffic. Payment traffic is in the 
form of general term payments and business development carried out by small group entrepreneurs or 
financing to develop co-operatives, developing non-oil and gas export businesses, increasing housing 
development, and others. 
All of these are the bank's efforts to make a profit. A bank's ability to earn or generate profits 
effectively and efficiently can be called profitability (Rahmi, 2014). Banks' highest income from 
credit interest is the consumer credit, in which there is a KPR (Home Ownership Credit) credit. So 
that banks can help fulfill people's rights to provide adequate housing. Home Ownership Loans (KPR) 
and Apartment Ownership Loans (KPA) can positively impact people acquire houses. Furthermore, 
this will also affect the Indonesian economy. Over the last few decades, KPR and KPA have been 
increasing along with the number of banks interested in being involved in providing financing for 
both the poor (MBR) and those who need subsidies (medium) or those who can buy their own without 
government subsidies (upper class). 
In 2018, the Ministry of PUPR had partnered with 40 banks to channel funds from the Housing 
Finance Liquidity Facility (FLPP) from 11 banks previously. During the 2010-2017 period, the 
government has disbursed FLPP funds of IDR 30.93 trillion for 519,828 subsidized housing units. 
Meanwhile, the FLPP funds to be distributed in 2018 will reach 42,326 housing units for next year's 
FLPP subsidized housing units with a value of IDR 4.5 trillion, consisting of IDR 2.2 trillion from the 
PUPR Ministry budget and IDR 2.3 trillion from optimizing principal returns. The 40 banks consist of 
6 national banks and 34 Regional Development Banks. The increasing number of banks interested in 
partnering with the government (PUPR Ministry) is inseparable from the number of housing subsidies 
and assistance (grants) allocated. For example, related to Housing Financing Assistance for MBR, the 
government, in this case, the Directorate General of Housing Financing, has housing financing 
assistance schemes, including the KPR Sejahtera Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (KPR 
Sejahtera FLPP) scheme, then the KPR Sejahtera SSB financing scheme. Also, the government 
provides Down Payment Assistance (BUM) for MBR. Especially for BUM, it is given for the 
purchase of subsidized landed houses. PUPR has proposed a budget allocation for subsidized housing 
for the people of Rp. 6.09 trillion in 2018. That is for subsidized KPR with a Housing Financing 
Liquidity Facility (FLPP) totaling 42 thousand housing units, a subsidized interest difference (SSB) of 
225 thousand units, and a subsidy for down payment assistance. (BUM) for 334 thousand houses. 
However, on the other hand, the existence of a loan to value policy from BI has made the demand for 
mortgage loans decrease because debtors feel that the down payment that must be met to make 
second, third, and so on is still too high. However, the supply of KPR loans increases because of 
Indonesia's large number of housing needs. The high supply is only absorbed by the demand for credit 
in a certain amount, which causes lending to experience a slowdown. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Legal Foundation for the 1 Million Homes Program 
Housing and settlement problems in Indonesia are increasingly severe and critical (Lisnawati, 
2015). According to the estimation of the Ministry of PUPR, the high number of backlogs that 
reached 13.5 million units in 2015 means that the government must be present in overcoming this 
problem. The need for housing annually reaches 800,000-1,000,000 units per year, while the 
government and developer capacity is only 400,000 units per year. If conditions do not change, the 
national housing backlog will be higher, especially considering Indonesia's average population 
growth, which reaches 1.49% per year. If the assumption is that the ability to provide housing by the 
government remains, the housing backlog will skyrocket (Pakpahan, 2015). Every citizen of Indonesia 
should have the right to live appropriately and have a healthy and comfortable occupancy, as 
mandated in: 
1. The 1945 Constitution Article 28 H paragraph (1) states that every person has the right to live in 
physical and spiritual prosperity, have a place to live, and have a good and healthy living 
environment, and the right to obtain health services. 
2. Law No. 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights, article 40, states that everyone has the right to 
live and have a decent life. 
Following the aforementioned statutory regulations, it is clear that the role of the State is 
needed in ensuring the fulfillment of housing needs for all Indonesian people 
One of the reasons for the high housing backlog is the low housing sector's low financing from 
the government and private sector (Lisnawati 2015). Solutions in overcoming the backlog include 
increasing the government's budget allocation for the housing sector, and the need for appropriate 
financing schemes by the policy direction and strategic targets set out in the 2015‐2019 RPJMN 
related to the development policy of 550,000 flats, 50,000 units. This development policy includes a 
program to build a million houses for the people, especially for low-income people (MBR). The 
construction of a million houses for the people is expected to complete the housing backlog gradually. 
As many as 603,516 housing units are targeted for low-income housing and 396,484 housing units for 
non-low-income groups from this million houses program. 
 
Concepts related to housing finance 
The main concepts that form the basis of the theory in this paper include: 
1. Home Backlog 
The housing backlog is one of the government's indicators, as stated in the Strategic Plan and 
the Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) related to the housing sector to measure Indonesia's 
housing needs. The home backlog can be measured from two perspectives: from the side of residence 
and ownership. 
a. Home Occupancy Backlog 
The housing backlog from the occupancy perspective is calculated by referring to the ideal 
calculation concept: 1 family occupies one house. The formula used to calculate the backlog of a 
house from a residential perspective is: 
 
Backlog = ∑Family - ∑Home 
 
In the attachment to Book 1 of Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2 
of 2015 concerning the 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the baseline 
backlog (occupancy) of houses in Indonesia in 2014 is 7.6 million. The concept of inhabiting in the 
backlog calculation represents that every family is not required to own a house. However, the 
government facilitates/encourages every family, especially those classified as Low-Income 
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Communities (MBR), to be able to live in a decent house, either by leasing / contracting, buying / 
occupying. or live in a house owned by a relative/family as long as the secure tenure is guaranteed. 
 
2. Home Ownership Backlog 
Ownership Backlog is calculated based on the homeownership rate/percentage of households 
that occupy their own houses. The primary data source used in this calculation is BPS data. How to 
calculate the homeownership backlog is as follows: 
 
Table 1. Home Ownership Backlog Calculation 
(Source: Housing Financing Fund Management Center, 2018) 
 
In the context of utilizing data and information to support the implementation of channeling and 
managing funds for the Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (FLPP). The Housing Financing Fund 
Management Center (PPDPP) continues to make efforts to utilize various strategic housing data, one 
of which is the homeownership rate/percentage of households ( households) who occupy their own 
houses in 2015 published by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) in 2016. 
The data shows that households that occupy their own houses have increased from 78% in 2010 
to 82.63% in 2015. Thus, the Backlog of Home Ownership, originally around 13.5 million households 
in 2010, has decreased to around 11.4 million households in 2015. This figure shows that in 2015 
there were 11.4 million Indonesian households, both Low-Income Communities (MBR) and non-
MBR, who lived in houses that did not belong to them. The results of the conversion of the data show: 
1. Provinces with the lowest homeownership rate (below 70%) are DKI Jakarta (51.09%) and Riau 
Islands (67.67%). The provinces with the most considerable backlog of homeownership (over 1 
million households) were West Java with around 2.3 million households, DKI Jakarta with 
around 1.3 million households, and North Sumatra with around 1.03 million households. 
2. Provinces with the highest percentage of homeownership rate (above 90%) are West Sulawesi 
(91.47%), Central Java (90.93%), East Java (90.46%), and Lampung (90.35%). The province 
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Government subsidies 
According to the public interest theory approach (public interest theories), regulation is 
presented in response to public requests for corrections to market prices' inefficiency or unfairness. 
This theory's primary purpose is to protect society and create a prosperous country (Stigler, 2014). 
According to Handoko and Patriadi (2005), subsidies are payments provided by the government 
to businesses and households with the hope of achieving better conditions. According to Rini (2006), 
subsidies can be direct or indirect. Direct subsidies can be cash, interest-free loans, and more, while 
indirect subsidies take exemptions from depreciation, rent deductions, and the like. The provision of 
subsidies in the housing sector is one of the government's policies towards providing housing, 
especially for low-income people. 
The correction of the very high housing market price does not allow low-income people to own 
a house. It is hoped that subsidies for low-income people will bring people, especially low-income 
people, to own a house. The government has allocated housing subsidies through the Ministry of 
Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR). In the 2015-2019 period, housing expenditures and 
subsidies for the PUPR Ministry are estimated to reach IDR 74 trillion. 
 
Housing Loans (KPR and KPA) 
Home Ownership Credit (KPR) is a credit facility provided by banks to individual customers 
who will buy or repair houses. In Indonesia, there are currently two types of KPR known: 
1. Subsidized KPR 
Subsidized KPR is a credit allocated to people with middle to lower-income to meet the needs 
of housing or repair houses they already have. The subsidies provided are subsidies to relieve credit, 
and subsidies increase funds for building or repairing houses. This subsidized credit is regulated 
separately by the government so that not every community applying for credit can be given this 
facility. In general, the government's limits in providing subsidies are the applicant's income and the 
maximum credit given. 
 
2. Non-Subsidized Home Ownership Credit (e.g., KPA) 
Non-Subsidized Home Ownership Credit (e.g., KPA) that is intended for the entire community. 
The bank determines the provisions for KPR So that the determination of the amount of credit and the 
interest rate is carried out according to the bank's policy concerned. The government's support 
program in housing finance for low-income communities was also continued as part of the One 
Million Houses for People Development Program launched by the government in 2015. In 2015, the 
government allocated funds of IDR 8.1 trillion to build 98,300 housing units and IDR 5 1 trillion in 
the form of FLPP to provide assistance and ease of financing for MBR, namely financing with a 5% 
KPR interest rate, tenor up to 20 years, 1% down payment and VAT exemption. 
The development of property loans is currently very dependent on the growth of housing and 
apartment ownership loans (KPR and KPA). In the future, the growth of KPR and KPA is still very 
potential, in line with the very great demand for housing in Indonesia and government support to 
encourage the property sector. Total KPR and KPA disbursements as of February 2017 reached IDR 
367.7 trillion or covering 52% of total property loans, following by construction loans and real estate 
loans with the portions of 30% and 18%. The development of KPR and KPA proliferated after the 
1998 monetary crisis. Before the crisis, namely in 1996, KPR and KPA in property loans was only 
around 28%. Their share of both increased rapidly because construction and real estate loans were 
under intense pressure due to the crisis that hit the Asian region. Starting in 2000, the portion of KPR 
and KPA increased rapidly, around 50% or even more than the share of 60% in 2012. 
The fast development of KPR and KPA is also supported by the well-maintained credit quality, 
with the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) below 3%. As of February 2017, the NPL ratio for KPR 
and KPA was 2.85%, lower than the NPL of total loans, which reached 3.16%. In more detail, the 
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NPL ratio for KPR is 2.86% and for KPA is 2.61%. In general, the distribution of KPR and KPA 
loans has a relatively low risk because it has collateral in the form of a house, whose value continues 
to increase. 
Until now, the distribution of KPR and KPA is still concentrated in Java Island by the dense 
population. Based on data from the Financial Services Authority (OJK) as of February 2017, 70% of 
the value of KPR and KPA is located in Java. After that are Sumatra (13%), Kalimantan (6%), 
Sulawesi (6%), Bali-Nusa Tenggara (4%), and Maluku-Papua (1%). The five provinces with the 
largest KPR and KPA distribution are DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Banten, and Central Java. 
Meanwhile, the five provinces with the lowest KPR and KPA distribution were West Papua, 
Gorontalo, Maluku, North Maluku, and West Sulawesi. 
 
Performance of KPR and KPA Banks Listed on The IDX 
The residential segment, namely apartments and housing, is the most significant contributor to 
the national property capitalization value, reaching 55.8%. The rate of growth in the capitalization 
value of the residential sector reached 16.5%, from Rp. 152.7 trillion to Rp. 177.9 trillion in 2017. 
Several factors have triggered an increase in the value of the property market capitalization in 2017. 
These factors include increasingly banking interest rates. Low and is expected to reach single digit 
and loan to value (LTV) loosening. Especially for MBR houses, the total budget provided by the 
government in 2017 is around Rp. 15.6 trillion. The budget includes several types of schemes. The 
Director-General of Housing Financing of the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR), 
for subsidized housing under the Housing Financing Liquidity Facility (FLPP) scheme from the 2017 
State Budget, is allocated IDR 9.7 trillion. The budget is estimated to be able to finance approximately 
120,000 to 130,000 housing units. The funds are added to the allocation of interest difference 
subsidies (SSB) of Rp. 3.7 trillion, with a target of building houses to reach 400,000 units. The PUPR 
Ministry also allocated IDR 2.2 trillion for Down Payment Assistance (BUM), and there are 
additional funds from the principal return of IDR 1.7 trillion. 
 
(Source: Housing Financing Fund Management Center, 2018) 
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KPR and KPA performance in the 2015-2017 Period 
Bank Indonesia (BI) noted that property loans grew 15% to Rp 731.4 trillion at the end of 
December 2016 compared to Rp 620.4 trillion at the end of December 2015. The property loan 
segment that grew the highest was construction with 24.2% or Rp 214.3 trillion as per December 2016 
compared to Rp 172.5 trillion as per December 2015. Followed by real estate loans, grew 22.2% to Rp 
130.8 trillion per December 2016 compared to Rp 107.1 trillion per December 2015. Meanwhile, 
loans for housing loans (KPR) and apartment ownership loans (KPA) only grew single digit or 8.1% 
to Rp 368.3 trillion as of December 2016 compared to the position of Rp 340.8 trillion as of 
December 2015. Based on data on sales of property companies that have gone public or Tbk (open) 
and are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. During the 2017 period, most of them did not reach 
the target; some were stagnant, only a few were increasing. As seen in the results Bank Indonesia (BI) 
third quarter (Q3) Residential Property Price Survey (SHPR) 2017. This face-to-face survey with 
respondents from developers in 16 major cities in Indonesia stated that home sales growth fell from 
3.61% to 2. 58% compared to Q2 (Q2) due to limited demand. Due to sluggish sales, the price was 
only up 0.5% (Q3) compared to 1.18% in Q2. SHPR estimates that the decline in sales growth and 
price increases will continue in the fourth quarter. 
Bank Indonesia (BI) noted that in a month, the distribution of property loans had accelerated, 
from 13% growth year on year (YoY) in October 2017 to 13.6% (YoY) in November last year. The 
property loan value as of November reached Rp. 791.8 trillion. The acceleration of property credit 
was mainly driven by loans extended to the construction sector and housing loans (KPR), and 
apartment ownership loans (KPA). BI data shows that the distribution of KPR and KPR in November 
reached Rp 402.9 trillion or grew 11% (YoY) or higher than Rp 397.4 trillion in the previous month, 
which grew 10.8% (YoY). The survey stated that the factors inhibiting the growth of the property 
business were mortgage interest (20.36%), down payment requirements (16.57%), taxes (16.13%), 
permits (14.45%), and increases. More than 76% of consumers still rely on bank credit (KPR / KPA) 
to buy a house. (OJK, 2018). Even though the market is still sluggish, several housing estates and 
apartments still record good sales (marketing sales). Some (outside the new town of Meikarta 
covering an area of 500 ha in Cikarang, Bekasi-West Java, which should be discussed separately) are 
pretty impressive, although the realization is still to wait. For example, Trans Park Cibubur 
(Cimanggis, Depok City-West Java), CitraLand Cibubur housing (Cileungsi, Bogor-West Java) and 
















(Source: Financial Services Authority, 2018) 
 
Figure 2. GDP Growth and National KPR Growth 
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Economic growth is expected to continue to show an upward trend wherein the 4th quarter of 
2017 reached 5.4% YoY. In line with the economic improvement. The growth in the supply and 
demand side of the housing sector is also expected to increase. 
 
Future Performance Challenges of KPR and KPA 
Macroprudential policy relaxation implemented by Bank Indonesia (BI) has been running for 
almost two years, since it was first implemented on June 18, 2015 (graph 1). Then, on September 1, 
2016, another Macroprudential policy relaxation was carried out, which was expected to encourage 
Home Ownership Credit (KPR) growth by 3.7 ppt within the 12 months since its implementation. 
However, after almost two years since the start of implementation, it turns out that the relaxing effect 
on bank credit growth has not been seen. To encourage economic growth from the monetary side, 
from the beginning of 2016 to the 1st quarter of 2017, Bank Indonesia implemented accommodative 
Monetary Policy in the form of: 
1. Interest Rate Policy, by lowering the reference interest rate (policy rate) by 150bps; 
2. Liquidity Policy, by reducing the statutory reserve requirement (GWM) by 150bps; and 

















(Source: Financial Services Authority, 2018) 
 
Figure 3. Implementation of KPR LTV Provisions in Conventional and Sharia Banking 
 
To be able to encourage economic growth, the BI Monetary Policy will go through two routes, 
namely: 
1. Interest Rate: along with the decline in the policy rate, other bank interest rates will also 
decrease, namely: 
a. Deposit interest rates decreased by 133 bps 
b. Lending rates fell by 93bps 
c. Mortgage interest rates fell by 77bps 
Bank interest rates fell in line with the policy rate, but the decline was not as fast as the policy 
rate decline. 
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2. Credit channel: with a decrease in interest rates, it is expected that credit growth will increase, 
but in reality, the increase in credit growth is relatively slow, where: 
a. Credit growth is only 9.2% YoY 
b. Rupiah Credit Growth of 8.9% yoy 
c. KPR growth was only 8.7% YoY 
It happened because banks were still focused on managing credit quality amidst the increasing 















(Source: Financial Services Authority, 2018) 
Figure 4. Implementation of KPR LTV Provisions in Conventional and Sharia Banking 
 
Figure 3 shows that when macroprudential relaxation was implemented in June 2015, mortgage 
growth was 7.0% YoY, which was the lowest since 2012. The relaxation in the housing sector did not 
impact mortgage growth because growth was relatively stagnant and increasing. Slightly to the level 
of 7.2% YoY in September 2016. After the second phase of relaxation in September 2016, KPR 
growth began to increase and was 8.7% YoY in March 2017. Meanwhile, credit to developers (Real 
Estate ) grew from 7.5% YoY in June 2015, then increased to 13.2% YoY in September 2016, but 
was slightly corrected to 12.4% YoY in March 2017. So far, the demand factor is considered the main 
factor for the slow growth of mortgages. However, when seen from graph three, it will appear that 
demand is not the only cause. Graph 3 shows that the NPL ratio of KPR shows an increasing trend 













(Source: Financial Services Authority, 2018) 
Figure 4. Comparison of the NPL ratio of Total Credit and the NPL ratio of KPR 
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In line with the improvement in people's purchasing power, KPR growth improved in the first 
quarter of 2017. This position is expected to continue to increase, considering that economic growth is 




Conclusions and policy implications that can be taken by financial institutions (banks) 
providing KPR and KPA in order to maximize opportunities for the ease of housing financing, which 
is a government program, so that its performance continues to be positive, are as follows: 
1. KPR and KPA providers need to increase their focus on the subsidized KPR segment. The 
demand and supply for this segment are still very much, so there is still much potential to be 
explored. However, because this segment is a government program, inevitably, it depends on the 
allocation and availability of the government budget. 
2. As a business entity, of course, the KPR / KPA provider bank needs to seek profit. A bigger 
profit that the bank itself can control is the Non-Subsidized KPR segment. The moment of 
accelerating growth for Non-Subsidized KPR is in line with the improvement in national 
economic growth. 
3. As the saying goes, "there is sugar, there are ants," so non-subsidized KPR is currently the main 
target of the KPR program for banks in Indonesia because the target market is young middle-
class people. Besides, the number will continue to increase. This group is not very sensitive 
(inelastic) to price changes, so that the profit margin of this segment will be bigger. 
4. With a higher profit margin, of course, it is the target of non-bank financial institutions, so that in 
the future, the competition map will be tighter. It can be seen from the increase in FLPP 
channeling banks for the Ministry of PUPR from 34 in 2017 to 40 banks in this 2018 fiscal year. 
All of them will strive to achieve higher growth in lending but maintain prudence to maintain 
asset quality. 
5. The objective of relaxing the Macroprudential Policy of Bank Indonesia (LTV) is to promote 
Credit to Real Estate (Non-Subsidized) and KPR for the middle to lower segments on a 
reasonable basis. When it has been implemented for three years, and the results are not 
previously thought, then the possibility of BI issuing regulations regarding additional relaxation 
is still open to it, so mortgage providers must anticipate it. 
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